May 26, 2025 Charts

May 26, 2025 Charts

Ports, Pipelines, and Policy: Insights from Heather Exner-Pirot

Ports, Pipelines, and Policy: Insights from Heather Exner-Pirot

This week, our guest is Dr. Heather Exner-Pirot, a Senior Fellow and Director of Energy, Natural Resources and Environment at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute in Ottawa, a Special Advisor to the Business Council of Canada, and a Research Advisor to the Indigenous Resource Network. Heather has twenty years of experience in Indigenous, Arctic and resource development and governance. She has published on Indigenous economic and resource development, energy security, and politics. 

Here are some of the questions that Peter and Jackie asked Heather: Does Canada have defense and security issues in the north? Politicians, including our Prime Minister, support Arctic export ports—do you expect to see new export corridors to the north? The Russians ship LNG from the Arctic, so why not Canada? What are your concerns about Prime Minister Mark Carney’s climate policy, as outlined in his Liberal leadership and election platforms? What are the issues with Canada’s greenwashing rules that were made law about one year ago? How would you recommend Canada move forward with speeding up the development of large projects—should the Impact Assessment Act (Bill C-69) be scrapped or just modified? What are the prospects for deploying small or micro nuclear reactors (SMRs) in the north? What does the future hold for Indigenous equity participation in major projects? 

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Episode 285 transcript

Disclosure:

The information and opinions presented in this ARC Energy Ideas podcast are provided for informational purposes only and are subject to the disclaimer link in the show notes.

Announcer:

This is the ARC Energy Ideas podcast, with Peter Tertzakian and Jackie Forrest, exploring trends that influence the energy business.

Jackie Forrest:

Welcome to the Arc Energy Ideas podcast. I’m Jackie Forrest.

Peter Tertzakian:

And I’m Peter Tertzakian. Welcome back. It is May. The month of May and it is campground season.

Jackie Forrest:

Yeah, that’s right. So this is-

Peter Tertzakian:

This is the time of year we talk about Jackie’s campground reservation experiences.

Jackie Forrest:

Exactly. And this is running after the May long weekend, so maybe someone has been camping. Yeah, this year is not going great. I got some of the sites I wanted, those federal sites, but these provincial sites, I’m trying to get some in BC, are almost impossible to get. You have to get them three months to the day that you want them, and then you log in at 8:00 in the morning and you sit there hitting the button and then in an instant they’re gone. Somehow, other people got them. So, so far my camping is 50/50, kind of mixed.

Peter Tertzakian:

I’m aging myself because when I used to do a lot of camping, there was no such thing as reservations. You just showed up and there was places available, but those days are long gone.

Jackie Forrest:

No, it’s not-

Peter Tertzakian:

So what do we do? We go further afield, we go further north, maybe go camping in the Arctic or… Well, actually speaking of the Arctic, we need to talk more about it. We’ve got a new prime minister that wants to talk about the Arctic and build out there. We had Chris Avery talk to us about Churchill and we’ll talk a little bit more about that. But I think we need to go even further north and question or talk about the possibilities of building infrastructure into our vast north. I’ve been up there myself, I’ve been as far north as Inuvik, been to Yellowknife many times, actually love it up there and want to go some more. But in terms of infrastructure development, we know it’s challenging. So this week, we have a special guest who is an expert on the Arctic amongst many other energy issues and infrastructure issues. So we’re delighted to welcome Dr. Heather Exner-Pirot, Senior Fellow and Director of Energy, Natural Resources and Environment at the esteemed Macdonald-Laurier Institute. Welcome, Heather.

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Delighted to be here.

Jackie Forrest:

Great, Heather. Well, we’re excited to have you on because we’ve really noticed a lot of your writing on energy issues and not just the north, and we’ll get into some of those. We’ll start with the north, but you’ve been a commentating on a lot of issues that are close to Peter and I and things we talk about. So we’re really happy to have you on today. But maybe you could just tell us a little bit about yourself and how living… I think you’re living near Calgary. Did you become an expert on Arctic economic issues and indigenous issues?

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Yeah, great story. So when I was finished up my masters and was looking for a job, something called University Arctic opened up at the U of S. It was about a consortium of Arctic universities across eight Arctic states. And I had been interning in Geneva and looking for an international NGO job. And lo and behold, the one in Saskatoon was about the Arctic. And then I went on to do my PhD research on that. And that was at the time of the last commodity cycle when the Arctic was, as we say, hot. That was when the Russians planted the titanium flag, when Stephen Harper was talking about using or losing it. So this whole cycle that we’re seeing today, we saw about 20 years ago, and I was writing my PhD in political science on it at the time and started to… Yeah, so that’s when I started to get into the Arctic.

And at some point, we were all talking about Arctic security. The first paragraph of every article about the Arctic was about climate change, opening up, a scramble for resources, China and Russia trying to get our resources. And at sometime, the commodity cycle busted and you had to acknowledge that there was no scramble, there is no race. In fact, the Arctic is so difficult to develop in, commodity prices have to be so high, really, we have a problem of not enough development. Not too much development.

Jackie Forrest:

Okay. Well, Peter’s started the interest saying he’s been to the north, but actually I think it’s even hard… Forget about doing energy development for Canadians to get to the north, and I’ve always wanted to go to the north, but every time I’ve looked at a holiday up there, it’s like I might as well do an African safari. It would be cheaper. So that’s why I was wondering if you’ve watched this show, North of North. I started watching it. It’s a Netflix show, I guess it’s a fictional community in one of those northern islands, kind of just west of Baffin Island way up in the north. And it’s a comedy, but what I loved is seeing the scenery and a bit of a window to the life that people have up there, which most Canadians haven’t seen. So anyway, I just thought if you’d seen it, and is there a way that we can get more tourists up there? I was thinking… We’re going to talk about getting more sovereignty over our north. Could tourism, like creating the infrastructure to support tourism, be one way of doing that?

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Yeah, I watched the first few episodes of that too, and it is kind of great to see what life is like a little bit of a window. In terms of tourism, you may… Iceland has been a huge success story. Iceland is a small island in the middle of the North Atlantic, but it’s become economic. It’s only I think 400,000 people. So it’s become a huge tourist hub. It’s their top industry. Greenland has been developing a tourism industry as well. And now in Yukon and Yellowknife, it’s actually a reasonable… Yukon has a pretty good tourism infrastructure, but it is expensive to get to. Nunavut in particular is expensive, and there’s a big carbon footprint, frankly, with getting tourists up to the north.

Jackie Forrest:

Right. Well, because we have so few that go up there.

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Yes.

Jackie Forrest:

Yeah. So you are a member, looking at your bio, of a lot of groups including the Global Arctic Mission Council on the Canadian Defense and Security Network and many other long organizations. But just tell us, what is the defense and security issues in the north? Do we have issues? Are there real signs that Russians are coming into our area or what are we concerned about?

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Yeah, great question. I think kind of at a superficial level, there is a sense or a fear in Canada that our sovereignty is at attack, that if we don’t use it again, we’ll lose it and that somehow the Russians will take over, the Chinese will start mining or drilling in the Northwest Passage. Those are things I’ve actually heard in-house committee testimony and that’s not exactly what the problem is. So usually the logistics of having an actual on the ground military conflict in the Arctic, particularly the Canadian Arctic, are so difficult. And it was an old joke from a Canadian general that if someone invaded our Arctic, our first task would be to rescue them. You just can’t survive long. You don’t have the logistics supply chain to survive. But the real legitimate issue that we have, which is why the Americans keep pressing us on NORAD, is this fear of hypersonic missiles coming over, that it is a shorter flank, attack vector as they would describe it of Chinese and Russian missiles, and as they develop better faster equipment, our radar has not been equipped to detect it.

And so a real sense of urgency of putting up kind of those monitoring surveillance stations, modernizing NORAD so that we can have plenty of time to detect them, that we could respond in case they did send something. And the real purpose is to deter, that if they know that we will detect whatever they send and it will not be successful, not hit targets in the south, just don’t do it to begin with. But if we are vulnerable there and we are right now, that ties our hands a little bit in how we operate, for example, in Taiwan.

Peter Tertzakian:

So this is the detection part of it. And I mean, I’m old enough to remember NORAD and all of the things that were put up there as a consequence of the Cold War. We do have countries like Finland, the Finns and the Scandinavian countries, even the Russians, are active up there with their military activities and their special groups, army groups that are up there. What do we have up there?

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Yeah, I mean, you have to appreciate that the Canadian Arctic is very vast, and radar stations is one, and we’ve had… The DEW Line is what you’re familiar… Turn into the North Warning System. But in terms of having a suite of, for example, F-35 that you could intercept something with, you can’t just stick one here and one there. You need to have a base with everyone that’s qualified to maintain it, pilot, operate it. And so that’s why we’ve put a lot of our NORAD bases further south, where you have more access to infrastructure, where you have more access to personnel. So we are lightly staffed, militarized in our Arctic, but we do have Canadian Rangers, which are kind of our ears on the ground. And the difference between… Yellowknife is still a couple hours of flight away from the one corner of Yukon or the other corner of Nunavut.

So in some ways people argue, “You’re just as good having it in Trent or in Winnipeg or Cold Lake,” that you’re not… Given the size of the region, you’re not much worse off. But anyways, on the European side, I just have to point out the reason why we talk about Russia being this Arctic power is because they put their northern fleet, which has most of their naval, nuclear capabilities on this peninsula, around the Barents.

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Yes, exactly. On the Cold Peninsula. The reason they do that is because that is open water year round. That is Russia’s only access to the North Atlantic year round. And so it happens to be in the Arctic, but it’s not to protect the Arctic, it’s because that’s where the Russians have their counter nuclear capacity vis-a-vis NATO. So it has been a militarized region, but it’s not to protect the Arctic, it’s to protect, basically, Russias-

Peter Tertzakian:

But even so…I mean, I don’t don’t know exactly what the latitude is, but it’s not that much further north than say Oslo, Stockholm. Those are all at 60 degrees, which was the border of the Northwest Territories and Alberta. The real north is in Russia’s… Is still further north than that, right?

Heather Exner-Pirot:

And that’s why… I listened to your podcast with Chris Avery, and this is a common assumption that in Canada, the further north you go, the colder it gets. And that’s true, but that is not exactly true on the European side. The way the Arctic is different between Russia, between North America, between Europe, is very much a condition of currents. And you have warmer currents on the European side than you do on the Canadian and on the Eastern Russian side. And so I’ve been up to Kirkenes and there’s green grass and people have backyards all the way up. It really looks like Northern BC to some extent. It’s a very different Arctic than the Canadian Arctic. And so it’s not latitude that makes you cold or remote, it’s other geographic conditions. And we are by far the most Arctic of the Arctic regions.

Jackie Forrest:

Okay, well you talked about that ice-free component because they have ice-free ports that go much farther north. And so of course, we’ve had lots of talk about building more Arctic ports, including Mark Carney and the Liberals and their platform. They want to increase the Arctic shipping of things like commodities, like oil, gas, maybe even grains. And you actually wrote a great article, which we will put a link to, April 14th this year, Northern corridors: Hype or hope? I do recommend people have a read of it. But you talked about that this isn’t a new thing that we’ve been talking… You had a news article from 1953 that proposed northern development from the Prime Minister John Diefenbaker at the time. So tell us, do you think that we are going to start seeing big export ports out of our north?

Heather Exner-Pirot:

I mean, no, not big export ports. And in the article I point out and… Churchill was developed in 1930, and so it’s been around for almost a hundred years. It had been planned even for decades before that, since the 1890s when we were settling Western Canada, people were thinking of all the places you could have ports to. And it’s never really taken off. And I think there has been an assumption that as we have climate change, sea ice is melting, that now these ports are opening up, became more viable routes, and that is not exactly what we’re seeing on the ground. That certainly, climate change has affected the Arctic. Certainly, sea ice has melted, but it has melted in ways that actually generally make it harder to ship, that the old kind of stable sea ice has largely melted in the summer, but the annual sea ice, it’s much thinner, comes back every year because the earth tilts at 23 degrees and it is dark and cold up there for three months of the year.

And that will always supersede other dynamics that you have. If it’s dark for three months, you will have ice come back and grow. And so what we have is a younger ice that is less predictable, that is burgier, that is flowing into choke points in ways that we aren’t totally able to predict and has actually made it more expensive. And this all comes down to insurance. Are the insurers more or less likely to insure this Arctic shipping than they were 10 or 20 years ago? No, they’re not. And this isn’t just a Canadian phenomenon of, “We can’t build things. We don’t do things here.” We’re seeing the same on the Russian side, that the way that the Arctic sea ice is melting is making it, again, more expensive, more unpredictable and more difficult to navigate.

Jackie Forrest:

And you talked about permafrost too. We learned from Chris Avery that one of the issues with the rail line is permafrost tends to heave in the winter and those issues get worse with climate change as well.

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Yeah. So I think there’s a superficial sense that climate change what was… On ice was what was preventing resource development in the Arctic. And there’s a lot more that goes into remoteness that makes it expensive to do. For example, mining in the Canadian Arctic than just climate change and sea ice. Most of the deposits… Because most of the land is interior. And so where you have to develop linear infrastructure in the Arctic, that gets extremely expensive. So it’s not only is the shipping not getting easier, but we have melting permafrost which makes things like building roads and railroads much more expensive. So even though you can do it and they’re doing the Hudson Bay Railroad and you can do the road from Tuktoyaktuk to Inuvik, but it’s more expensive to do so. So if you’re a mining company looking to develop and you have to do linear infrastructure, that’s harder.

The other thing they’ll often do is just use an ice road and that season has to be very cold for a couple of weeks before… It has to be a very thick layer before you can drive these big trucks on it. And that season with climate change has actually gotten shorter. And so last year was actually… We had a very warm fall. You guys remember that? It was warmest year on record. My husband works at one of the drive-in mines in the Northwest Territories actually. And they had, I think, about two week later ice road season than they would expect and they would plan for, they were starting to run low on diesel. And then just the logistics now of, what, turning an eight-week season into a six-week season, all the trucks, all the storage, all the warehousing they had to do. Again, it’s just logistically more difficult. But these are the infrastructure challenges. If the commodity price is high enough, you can get around all these infrastructure challenges. The commodity price has not been high enough for at least a decade.

Peter Tertzakian:

Well, let’s get back to the vastness. Flying up there. I mean, you’re just flying. You fly and you sort of tap your fingers on the table of the airplane seat and just go… You look out the window, it’s just snow and ice for several hours flying from Edmonton. So I mean, it’s just the logistical challenges and the costs of building up there is just huge, right?

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Yeah. I mean, so the mines that we have… And I’ll focus on resource development because of your show, but it applies equally to communities and to military bases. Where we have developed mines in the territories… There’s eight mines in the territories right now. One is an iron mine, so heavy, but it’s because there’s world-class deposit about a hundred kilometers from tidewater on Baffin Island. And so if you can have a deposit, and this has happened a few times, we’ve seen it with Voisey’s Bay, we see it with a nickel mine in Northern Quebec. We’ve seen it with Polaris mine before. Now we have it with this iron mine in Baffinland.

If you’re close to tidewater, then okay, you can store and you can stockpile over the course of eight or nine months and then you have your shipping season for three months when the ice has opened, that’s fine. The other seven mines are golden diamonds. And that’s because you don’t need a railroad or a road to ship out golden diamonds. They actually ship it out by plane because the weight to value ratio is so good for gold bars and for diamonds that it makes sense. So it has been very difficult to develop base metals or iron in the Arctic because you just need so much more infrastructure to get it done.

Peter Tertzakian:

So let’s extend that to, say, liquefied natural gas, the Russians building their Yamal facility, which I think is about the same latitude as Inuvik, out to roughly 70 degrees north. And I know you just said that there’s differences in the Arctic depending upon which hemisphere, east or west that you’re in. But can you talk about ideas actually like deep back to the 1970s of building something like hydrocarbon exports, whether it’s LNG or oil or otherwise?

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Yeah, well, I mean your listeners will probably be familiar that Alaska did it in the ’70s, kind of in the wake of the OPEC embargo when the United States was looking for domestic sources and we knew it was in Alaska. But have a look at a map of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. The resource is actually on tidewater, it’s on the north slope in Alaska, but it is so difficult to ship from that part of the Arctic that they actually built an 800-mile pipeline going south to cut to… Valdez is actually the port-

Peter Tertzakian:

It’s south…

Heather Exner-Pirot:

… close to Anchorage. And Anchorage’s port is open pretty much year-round. It’s pretty much a year-round open port. So we’d rather build an 800-mile pipeline across Alaska, the entire state, than ship out of the Arctic. Now when people talk about Churchill or about exporting LNG from northern ports in Canada, we always say, “Well, the Russians do it.” And that is true. So let me tell you about Yamal LNG. One thing is that it’s just an absolute world-class monster resource. That Russia has the world’s largest reserves of natural gas and 80% of those are in its Arctic and its resource happens to be on the Arctic, on tidewater, and that Yamal Peninsula and across from it, but it has a warm current, most of it was intended to go to Europe.

This is a richer market, better market, closer market. Europe needed the gas. And that is a warmer current and you have a longer season and they did get some ice strength and LNG carriers and the intention was to go to Asia in the warmer summer months. And now obviously, that’s posing issues for them and certainly economic issues. But the point I’m trying to say is the path to go west out of Yamal Peninsula to Europe is a lot easier than the path to go out of any place in the Canadian Arctic with LNG. So not only would you need your own fleet of ice strength and LNG carriers, but you would be ice blocked for several months of the year as the Russians are from going down the northern sea route east towards Asia for several months of the year.

Peter Tertzakian:

Right.

Jackie Forrest:

And you had one other point actually that’s worth mentioning is the reason they developed it there is the gas resource is there. Here we’re talking about taking gas from Northern BC and moving it all the way to the Arctic, right?

Peter Tertzakian:

Well, this is a whole separate discussion. I would time out on that because my first summer job, most people don’t know, was mapping the gas and oil reserves of the Arctic and there was drilling done in there in the ’60s and ’70s and basically the wells have just been capped and shut in and abandoned. But the resource is huge in Canada too.

Heather Exner-Pirot:

It is, and I just want to build on that point, Peter, because that is true, we absolutely are natural gas rich in Northwest Territories and in that Inuvik region, we had thought about the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline probably when you were down there, but what happened… And the last time the Arctic was hot, when I was writing my PhD, we remember, oil prices hit $147 a barrel. And gas was also equally high. And that’s when we were all focused on the Arctic. Shell had its ill-conceived Arctic drilling program. I think they lost $6 billion on that. There was drilling off the coast of Greenland, never went anywhere. What happened was the Shell Revolution came online and all of a sudden the business case for natural gas development and the Arctic and for oil development there just collapsed. Oil sands also came online. So no one is going to invest in Arctic oil in Canada or Alaska or anywhere when you can just invest into the oil sands.

Peter Tertzakian:

Or our Shell resources in the Montney. For sure.

Jackie Forrest:

Now before we leave the topic of the Arctic though, you are optimistic on one particular example. So Gray Bay Road and Port, which I had never heard of until I read the liberal platform. So it was actually listed as a potential nation-building project. Tell us why you may be a little bit more optimistic on that one.

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Yeah. And I listened to your show with Chris Avery and I think he’s great and he’s doing a great job for that port. I think there is a case for exporting some critical minerals out of Manitoba that are produced near to that region. And the same with Gray’s Bay, that if you can produce some critical minerals or gold or whatever you need to do from around there, go ahead and that makes sense. And again, you can stockpile it. You don’t have to worry about seasonal shipping. But what’s happening in Northwest Territories that I think is underappreciated is that they have three mines, three diamond mines, and those are all nearing the end of their lifespan. And the commodity price of diamonds has also just absolutely tanked. And so we expect that the first one, Rio Tintos will close in the first quarter of 2026 and the other two will close likely by the end of this decade.

That’s a quarter of Northwest Territories GDP. There may be a small mines in the pipeline, but there’s nothing to replace the size of that diamond industry. So NWT now is really looking at, “How do we replace that portion of economy, how do we build something else?” And the solution that has come up is this Arctic Security Corridor, so to develop road infrastructure, linear infrastructure from Yellowknife going all the way to Grays Bay, into Nunavut. And so on the one aspect, the territories, they want these big infrastructure projects, they need federal support. So one of it is that you would have to have federal support if you wanted to do this. It would open up the region to mining, but they wouldn’t show up in Canada’s GDP. But it’d be very important for the region and for the territory.

And so everyone’s pitching, the time is right to pitch nation-building projects. They’ve aptly smartly named it the Arctic Security Corridor to get a little bit higher off the list and it would open up the region to development. So I’m absolutely not against it. You have to think the cost benefit for the amount of mining that you get, is it worth maintaining that linear infrastructure? But certainly, I can see why the territory and the Inuit of the region are advancing it.

Peter Tertzakian:

So how much of that road is an ice highway versus a paved highway?

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Well, I think they want to make it a permanent road, and they did do that with the Inuit Tuktoyaktuk Road to make it, as they call, all season. Now, I think in the spring it’s very challenging, but that is the idea. One thing about the diamond mines, they shared a winter road and it costs millions of dollars every year to build it, and they never did make it into a permanent road. And now there’s a bit of a sense that that was a mistake that given all the money that you put in for 20 years into building this winter road, you could have maybe invested a bit more upfront to make it a permanent road and then you would have some more road infrastructure for some other deposits there. So I think the intention with this one is to make it permanent all season.

Jackie Forrest:

Okay.

Peter Tertzakian:

Have you seen that show Ice Road Truckers?

Heather Exner-Pirot:

I very… Yeah. A little bit. Yes.

Jackie Forrest:

Heather’s too busy working.

Peter Tertzakian:

Speaking of shows Jackie.

Jackie Forrest:

On a similar topic, I was just reading an article that you got to get your Canadian diamonds now and that they’re etching what mine they came out of because there’s going to… I actually didn’t realize that those diamond mines were kind of nearing end of life, so they’re like going to be a rare commodity. Okay, well let’s switch topics to Mark Carney’s climate plan. You actually wrote something on that in February, 2025, and this is before he became a leader of the liberal party and he had published a climate plan as part of the platform he was running under to get chosen as the leader. And it included things like a carbon border adjustment tax and sustainability guides requirements to do more sustainability reporting. And you wrote that it was outdated. So do you still think that where we are today?

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Well, I think everyone thinks that now. Times have changed. And let me just say from our previous conversation to this and how I moved from the Arctic to energy myself is following the Arctic and everyone talked about this resource race and commodities boom and scramble for the Arctic. And at some point I realized this wasn’t in fact the case. In fact, amongst all my colleagues, all of us social scientists, not one of us knew very much about resource development. Certainly not the economics or the business of it. You maybe know the indigenous rights impacts, but we were not well versed in the business of resource development and how difficult it is. And so I became, I guess, a bit of a contrarian in the Arctic space or looking at the resource sector, I think from a different perspective of others and seeing a lot of narrative on the Arctic that just was not realized in actual fact and reality.

And I think that’s how I came into the energy space was seeing that same, I don’t know if you would call it bias or just a perspective that I didn’t think was fulsome into accounting for what the industry was really facing or how energy is actually developed and implemented. So the conversation has changed dramatically in a few different ways. I think one post-COVID, where we moved down the hierarchy of needs, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs from kind of self-actualization towards really just focusing on your material needs, that changed the conversation on energy really to move towards affordability. Then you had Russia invade Ukraine and that really turned the conversation towards energy security and now energy has become much more pragmatic and we have seen Greenlash, we’ve seen some of the promises of renewables not coming to the same fruition or cost that we had hoped as we saw happen with Spain as Germany has been saying.

And so when I saw Carney’s climate plan, as… I say in the article, this could have been written in 2019, “Were they not aware of what had happened with COVID, what had happened with Russia, what happened with the pushback the deindustrialization of Europe? Are we not incorporating this into our policies?” And I have to say, I’ve been very influenced by you, Jackie, and you, Peter, of calling some of this out that 10 years on from the Paris Accord, we have some learnings. What we thought in 2015 is certainly not what we think in 2025 and we had better see our policies and our political leaders adjust for that. And we aren’t sure how much Carney is going to adjust for that or not.

Jackie Forrest:

Right. Well, Peter knows I have taken on the project of listening to Mark Carney’s values book. I actually tried to read it in 2021, but I just couldn’t get through it and I’m almost through, I’m ON hour 23 out of 24, but actually his climate thinking was very similar in that book. He has a couple of chapters where he really goes onto his ideas around energy and climate, but it got me thinking just as your point, actually, a lot of people had those ideas in 2021. The problem is the rest of the world isn’t all doing the same thing. So if Canada continues down that path, the cost of our energy is going to be higher than our competitors who aren’t doing that. And so I think it’d be interesting if I ever get a chance to talk to Mark Carney about it, if his views have changed, certainly from the policies he put forward, I would say they’re pretty consistent with what he talked about in 2021. But of course, we have the real realities of other things in our economy right now that are going to be priorities as well.

Peter Tertzakian:

You talked about green lashing just a few moments ago, and then there’s greenwashing, and you published in February, 2025, a report which we’ll post also as well, Canada’s greenwashing amendment referring to Bill C-59. You pointed out the pros and cons of the process, largely the flaws and also even called it greenhushing as it hurts investors who can no longer assess the carbon risk of a company, which is something that Jackie and I have talked about a lot. Talk about that report and do you think now with this new liberal government that there can be something done about C-59?

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Yeah, I hope so. So in the paper we go through all the ways in which it is flawed, and almost Orwellian, our good friend Tristan Goodwin called it Orwellian and I agree. So the things that the greenwashing amendment did is a series. So one, it gives private rights of action. So before it was competition law, your competitor could file a complaint with a competition Bureau. Now it opens up to everybody and we know who everybody is in this case. A lot of the environmental NGOs who’ve already written manuals on how to use the competition law to be able to file complaints about oil and gas companies, that actually goes into effect June 20th. So it’s a one-year process from when the legislation passed to when the private rights of action come into play. And that is obviously very scary. Why is it scary? Because you don’t have to lie to be found a foul of the amendment.

You have to not be able to prove your claim with internationally recognized methodology. What is internationally recognized methodology? They don’t define it. They don’t say what that is. For some things in new technologies, in battery tech or in carbon tech, there is no internationally methodology. These are new things that don’t have a whole international system around them. They also introduce a reverse onus. That means if somebody files a complaint, which I just told you can be just… Anybody now can file a complaint. It’s up to that oil and gas company or that business to say why what they said was proven was true. And even if they can do that, that will likely take hundreds of thousands or more in legal fees. If they’re found a foul, and this is the fourth thing, there’s a very punitive fine.

So if they can’t prove their claim and they say you can’t have aspirational claims, that’s literally the guidance from the Competition Bureau. No aspirational claims about the future, about environments. You can’t say, “We’re on our way to meet 2050,” because you can’t prove what you’ll do in 2050. If they are found a foul, the fine is $10 million or 3% of your global gross revenues, whichever is higher. If you’re Cenovus or CNRL, you’re talking about a billion dollar fine. That’s 3% of their gross for making a claim that you just can’t prove with international recognized methodology, which they have not defined.

Peter Tertzakian:

I haven’t followed this because… How old is C-59? When did they pass that thing?

Heather Exner-Pirot:

June 20th-

Peter Tertzakian:

June 20th…So we’re coming up to a year. I mean, has there have been any challenges, lawsuits, complaints filed, fines, anything, what’s happened?

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Well, the Competition Bureau was already well-equipped to do this, and we had the Volkswagen Diesel kind of debacle where Volkswagen was-

Peter Tertzakian:

Dieselgate. Yeah.

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Yeah, they received a very heavy fine through the regular… And Keurig also, they made some claims about their pods, were investigated and received a fine. Now, what happened on June 20th is everyone just took everything down from their websites and the Competition Act also expanded. So it wasn’t just your business activities, which is normally what Competition Act be regulating, but all of your communications could be to your investors, to your stakeholders, to the government. And so everyone just took all this down. What’s interesting is just last week RBC said that, “We were no longer going to have the sustainable finance reporting because we’ll be a foul of the greenwashing amendment if we give this…” So no one in Canada… This should be the opposite of what… If you care about the climate and climate policy, no one in Canada is willing, their lawyers are telling them, “Don’t talk about this because you may very well be subject to-

Peter Tertzakian:

But there haven’t been any legal tests-

Heather Exner-Pirot:

No. Well, so the private rights of action going to… Everyone has their eye on that June 20th date when these private groups can start to make complaints. Right now, only Competition Bureau can direct those complaints. After June 20th, that’s when people fear it’ll open up.

Jackie Forrest:

Plus, there are some draft proposal to try to define a little bit better, what you can report and how you report it. But I would just say… I sit back this, this is just a real mess, right? This hurts investors who can no longer assess carbon risk as much as it hurts the companies. So I go back to Mark Carney, he’s a real believer in sustainable transparency, having information for investors to assess the risk of investing in a company. Well, today, investors don’t have that. So I really hope that we can kind of make some changes here because it hurts the companies too because now they can’t even talk about what they’re doing in terms of improving their emissions. There’s no information available at all.

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Yeah. And you guys are… You all know Kevin Krausert of Avatar Invitations, he put in a really good submission and wrote an op-ed on it. But for him, and for those in Cleantech, what you’re selling is the idea that you’re proving some kind of technology that will reduce emissions in the future. And so it’s really those Cleantech innovators that are most harmed. If you’re oil and gas, no one’s investing in you because of your emissions profile. So okay, they just aren’t going to talk about it. But the ones that are actually where their business case relies on the fact that they can somehow reduce more emissions with the new technology in the future, those are the ones that are really handcuffed with this.

Jackie Forrest:

Well, I would say too though, even those investors in some of the oil and gas companies are handcuffed because they can’t assess their risk anymore either, right?

Heather Exner-Pirot:

No. And in indigenous stakeholder relations, I know, when you’re trying to communicate to your indigenous partners that you are responsible, you are reliable, that you’re making best efforts at reducing emissions, you can’t communicate to those indigenous partners either unless you have internationally recognized methodology to support what you’re saying. So it’s also harming industry’s ability to communicate to your indigenous partners.

Peter Tertzakian:

Well, let alone harming free speech as a broad principle in our society here, in our democratic society. So where should we move on to? How about Europe and LNG?

Jackie Forrest:

Yeah, this is a great conversation because we’re just hitting every topic right now, but you also wrote something in February of 2024. We will put a link to this. For all of these publications, we’ll put a link. From Emergency to Miracle: Germany’s LNG Acceleration Law, and you really dove into what Germany did to speed up the ability for them to build infrastructure like those regasification terminals that they needed when they were getting off Russian gas. Of course, there’s a huge debate in Canada right now. Some argue that we should just scrap this Bill C-9, which is actually called the Impact Assessment Act now. Others like the liberals are committing to making it shorter, like two-year reviews, but the industry and the conservative party want six-month reviews. So you’ve spent some time looking at what Germany did and have an understanding of our indigenous requirements for consultation, especially from the federal government. What do you think we need to do here? Do we keep the existing one and improve it? Do we scrap it? What’s the best option?

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Yeah, I think it’s unconstitutional in the first place, and the Supreme Court said it was unconstitutional. October, 2023, the federal government made some amendments, but Alberta doesn’t think it’s constitutional. Neither does Saskatchewan. They’re already preparing their next challenge. So something I think has to be done with it because not only is it unconstitutional, it’s bad policy, and it’s been said many times that under the Impact Assessment Act has passed in 2019, only one project has actually been approved under its auspices, Cedar LNG. And so a lot either just never got proposed because the proponent didn’t think that there was any way forward. There was too much risk, no light at the end of the tunnel or it’s still in process. So I wrote that German LNG paper because in the west, I would say in the last five years, we’ve all been handwringing that it seems like we can’t build anymore.

And it’s not just a Canadian problem. It’s certainly an American and a European problem also. And so to have an example where the Germans did build something big, a major project in just 10 months, so we know that we can do it, we just haven’t done it. I remember also thinking that when the number one highway washed out in BC, that we rebuilt it within weeks, and I thought, “We can do this.” It’s not an issue of capabilities, it’s an issue of regulatory. So in terms of what we can do to build major infrastructure, I don’t think there’s any way you can do to consult in six months unless the proponent did all that prep work ahead of time and had those indigenous partners at the beginning. Let’s walk before we run. Right now, we’re averaging, depending on how you count, 6, 8, 10 years for a lot of projects.

So I would love to see two, but you know what, four years and three years, that’d also be a lot better than what we’re seeing now. But I think, really, the top thing is for the federal government to state it’s jurisdictional lane, this easiest thing, the low-hanging fruit that a liberal government could do if we’re just a little bit less ambitious than we would with the conservative government, is narrow the projects list. The Impact Assessment Act comes with a projects list of projects that will go under that federal assessment, narrow it so it’s clearly projects just under federal jurisdiction. It wouldn’t include mines, wouldn’t include refineries, wouldn’t include oil sands. Narrow it to their jurisdiction and let the provinces regulate all those other projects.

Jackie Forrest:

Right. Yeah, because this list that has things that are just within provincial borders like oil sands or mining projects. So-

Peter Tertzakian:

But the question was sort of targeted at the federal level, build a list, build a project list, but then there is the provincial level, which you just alluded to. So what are the challenges provincially?

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Yeah. Well, this is a great question because we have focused, and certainly I have focused, it’s easy in Alberta to hammer on the federal government for interfering, and they have not been helpful. But when you want to devolve that jurisdiction back to the provinces, which is their constitutional right and their constitutional lane, well, you better hope that the provinces are good at regulating these things too. But if you’re operating in, I’ll just say for example, British Columbia, you don’t have maybe the most responsive energy regulator either. And the Fraser Institute actually does a great survey both of energy jurisdictions and mining jurisdictions, and a handful of Canadian provinces do well, mostly, we don’t. So we do want to see improvements at the provincial level also, but I’ll give you some good news, is BC was maybe considered the hardest jurisdiction or the most burdensome jurisdiction for especially oil and gas development for resource zone in particular.

EB has been saying and doing a lot of the right things. They did put in a fast track list after all the Trump terror threats and then has moved the needle on things in Enbridge. I heard the VP from Enbridge saying they had a project. It was put on the fast project list, it was Aspen Pipeline into provincial pipeline system and moved it forward faster. They had FID at the construction. They’re constructing now just within months. So it is possible for the provinces to move faster. I think bureaucracy needs to come along, the regulators need to come along, but everyone needs to have hands on deck.

Peter Tertzakian:

Okay, LNG, let’s move on to nukes.

Jackie Forrest:

Right. Well, and I do want to add, Heather, just breaking news in the last few weeks, finally, we found out what these Ontario small modular reactors are going to cost. That was something that was always missing. So they announced that the four units together will cost $21 billion Canadian for 1,200 megawatts of capacity. Now, the first one’s going to be more expensive. They’re assuming by the time the fourth one’s in to this complex, the cost will come down, but that’s the collective cost. Now, that sounds like a lot of money, but you got to think that these are going to be working for 40 years. And so this levelized cost analysis is usually done to look at different types of electricity. And if you think it’s a 40-year thing, that they think the levelized cost is 15 cents a kilowatt-hour, which they say is fairly comparable to wind, solar, and batteries.

And by the way, that 15 cents a kilowatt-hour includes the government investment tax credit, which means the federal government’s going to pay maybe 30% of the capital cost of that. Now, I went to look at this, the most recent big nuclear plant built in North America, that’s the Georgia Vogtle Plant, which was about twice the size. But when I correct for capacity and the currency, it’s actually pretty similar in cost to what Ontario Power Generators is talking about. Now, these SMRs were supposed to be cheap and small, and there’s actually a video where… I’ll put a link to the video in the show notes. They’re certainly not small. They show a drone video footage of what the construction site looks like right now, they’ve actually started a lot of the groundworks, and I wouldn’t say they’re cheap, but maybe they’re comparable. Maybe they’re in the money in terms of what your other options are.

Just for comparison, natural gas, levelized cost, depending on where you are, could be maybe as low as 10 or 9 cents. So their natural gas would be cheaper potentially, but doesn’t have 40 year life either. So anyway, with that background, Heather, I just thought I’d give that, we talk a lot about SMRs coming across the country. Saskatchewan talks about them, Alberta talks about them. Maybe this gives us a sign, by the way, if they can do it for this cost, because often the initial cost ends up not being the final cost. Do you think there’s potential for nuclear energy in Canada, including the north, at that type of cost level?

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Yeah. Well, I mean, the OPG ones are a special case, and you have to remember that this is a first of a kind, and as they often say, “This first in G7, really building an SMR,” and so your first is obviously going to be very expensive, and until you probably get to N of 12 or N of 15 where the cost curve starts to come down, and we sell that with solar, you see that with every kind of technology. And so OPG is taking a risk. They are being a first mover. I think they’re hoping to see dividends on some of the servicing that comes out of it. They already have a deal with Poland. They have a deal with Saskatchewan. They have a deal in Tennessee Valley Authority who’s moving ahead with this model, which tells me that they must have some confidence actually of what’s happening with OPG instead of turning away.

So OPG and GATAS, you’re trying to get to that Nth of 12, Nth of 15th where you get the cost curve down and then it starts to get cheaper. But in terms of… That’s the 300 megawatt on grid nuclear plant. What I’m interested in for the Arctic is the microreactors, and those are often maybe a 15 megawatt. Maybe you can stack a few of those when you’re talking about microreactors. And why is that important? Again, I’m going back to the cost of doing mining and the logistics of that. Right now you have to use diesel, and we can dump on diesel because it’s polluting and it’s bad for air pollution, all those things. But it really is a phenomenal fuel for the Arctic in that you can store it and you can store it all year. It’s reliable at minus 40 in the dark.

You can use it for your transportation fuels. You can use it for electricity generation, and you can use it for your heating one fuel in one tank in one community. And no other source of energy is anywhere near providing all those tools for remote community or for a remote mine. And right now, a lot of those remote mines, just to give you some perception of the scale, bringing about 60 million liters of diesel a year, that’s what they need to operate for the year. So just imagine the cost, $16 million of diesel, they’re having to build the ice road, having to warehouse it, run the generator. At that point, then you start to think, “Maybe a microreactor isn’t so bad. Maybe a microreactor is competitive with that kind of thing.”

The additional advantage of a microreactor can’t do everything diesel can do, but in terms of security, you can bury the microreactor, whereas a diesel tank just sitting there, adjacent, for example, a NORAD station or a small base, is really a sitting duck and a potential explosive. You know what I mean? If you just hit that diesel tank, everything goes. So there are some benefits to microreactors that I think a country like Canada really needs to explore. It’s the only way we’re going to get off of diesel at any kind of significance, but there’s so many other great reasons to advance microreactors.

Jackie Forrest:

Well, and I understand there is a trial at Chalk River right now for a fairly small unit. Any idea what the costs of that are looking like, or-

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Well, I… No, and they’re pretty close, holding it to the chest. The one I’ve been watching is Westinghouse eVinci, Saskatchewan Research Council has already committed, has sent an MOU to host that as a demonstration project to be the first one. There is some indigenous groups starting in Saskatchewan lining up to want to host that energy generation. Obviously, energy is very expensive in northern Saskatchewan. So we are seeing some models move ahead. CNSC is licensing some models already, helping the… As they move through the process, making sure that they’ll be able to be regularly at the end of it. And so I often ask, “How much does it cost?” There’s been some feasibility studies. But yeah, until we start. And again, until you see the 5th or 6th, don’t tell me what the cost is for the first of kind. I know it’s going to be expensive. What does the 8th or the 10th or that series look like?

Peter Tertzakian:

Well, and the reality is there already is micronuclear reactors up in the Arctic and they’re in submarines. In the American and Russian submarines. So there’s already-

Heather Exner-Pirot:

And floating nuclear plants in the Russian Arctic, by the way.

Peter Tertzakian:

So this is nothing new. It seems to be like something that’s potentially to keep our eye on and follow. Do we have time for one more question? Should we talk about indigenous matters, which you’ve written about extensively? We… Well, at least certainly I see a lot of momentum behind indigenous owned or indigenous sponsored projects. Cedar LNG is a great example. We’ve had Chief Crystal Smith on our program before. The new federal government, and a liberal plan is suggesting with another 5 or $10 billion in loans. Maybe just talk about that, but also talk about the point at which you think that these indigenous led initiatives, which are very impressive and have gaining momentum, are almost in a self-sustained economy where they can finance themselves and we have true lift off.

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Yeah, great question. So this loan guarantee program has been a huge boon to provide indigenous equity, and especially linear projects and electricity generation, a kind of project that gets a long-term contract and has very low risk. So anything that a utility would do has been a good fit for these loan guarantees because the government wants a very low risk project. When you start to get to think about mines or upstream oil and gas, that’s a very different risk profile and maybe isn’t a great fit for the loan guarantee, but would be a fit for some other kind of policy. So now we’ve seen Cedar LNG, we’ve seen quite a few hydro projects that were indigenous led, indigenous owned, and now the next big LNG project, Ksi Lisim is being led by the Nisg̱a’a as well as the Prince Rupert Gas transmission. So for $10 billion in capitalization, if you think about the multiple of that in your capital stack, that’s a lot of projects.

And in some cases, an ACCO or Hydro‑Québec have actually funded where you didn’t need a loan guarantee program that they came in and helped fund that equity, TC energy, that kind of thing. So lots of potential there. Not every project is a good candidate for equity. So it doesn’t need to be the gold standard. It’s not the solution to every project to get that indigenous involvement. Not every Indian community wants to be an equity holder in a project that does involve some different risks and different commitments, but it’s been a great solution, especially for linear projects and especially for pipelines.

Jackie Forrest:

Yeah. But mining projects, I guess it’s not a great fit because there’s no guarantee for the next 20 years what you’re going to make off of mine.

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Now, this is where we come full circle, Jackie, because I think the microreactor is a very good fit for the loan guarantee model because the community could own the microreactor, sell that electricity to the mine, it gets off the mines books. That’s less capital that they have to put into the project, but they can provide that guarantee price of electricity regardless of the volatility of the commodity.

Peter Tertzakian:

Well, Heather Time’s up, but we could talk for a lot longer, as it is with many of our podcasts. We’ve covered the waterfront from Arctic, Arctic LNG, Bill C-59, C-69, nukes, small modular reactors nukes, microreactors, indigenous issues, and the list goes on. So I think we’ve just had covered the waterfront, if not the Canadian-Arctic waterfront, which is very long. It’s been a great conversation. Thank you so much, Heather Exner-Pirot… Or should I say Dr. Heather Exner-Pirot, Senior Fellow and Director of Energy, Natural Resources and Environment at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. Thanks so much for joining us.

Heather Exner-Pirot:

Yeah. It’s my pleasure. Thanks, guys.

Jackie Forrest:

Thank you. And thanks to our listeners. If you enjoyed this podcast, please rate us on the app that you listen to and tell someone else about us.

Announcer:

For more ideas and insights, visit arcenergyinstitute.com.

May 19, 2025 Charts

May 19, 2025 Charts

Oil Price Volatility: Recession Fears and OPEC+ Surprise

Oil Price Volatility: Recession Fears and OPEC+ Surprise

After averaging around $US 75/B over the past few years, the WTI oil price fell below $US 60/B in early May. The weakness is driven by growing concerns about a potential recession resulting from US tariffs and announcements from the OPEC+ group that they will accelerate adding supply to the market, just as demand may be softening. 

To help us understand the recent volatility in oil prices, our guest this week is Jeremy Irwin, Global Crude Lead at Energy Aspects. 

Here are some of the questions Peter and Jackie asked Jeremy: Is this a repeat of 2015, when OPEC decided to flood the market to weaken US shale oil producers? Is President Trump influencing the OPEC+ strategy, as he may want lower oil prices to help offset the inflationary effects of US tariffs? At current price levels, how will US oil production respond? If profit is tight at lower prices, will US oil producers prioritize paying shareholders or capital spending? How might changes to US sanctions on Venezuela, Russia, and Iran impact the oil market? When do you expect global (and China’s) oil demand to peak? In the short term, how serious is the threat of recession to oil demand? Do you expect Canadian oil export infrastructure to expand? 

Content referenced in this podcast:

  • See the Energy Aspects website to learn more about their research data, tools, and consulting services 

Please review our disclaimer at: https://www.arcenergyinstitute.com/disclaimer/

Check us out on social media:

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LinkedIn: @ARC Energy Research Institute

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Episode 284 transcript

Disclosure:

The information and opinions presented in this ARC Energy Ideas podcast are provided for informational purposes only and are subject to the disclaimer link in the show notes.

Announcer:

This is the ARC Energy Ideas podcast, with Peter Tertzakian and Jackie Forrest, exploring trends that influence the energy business.

Jackie Forrest:

Welcome to the Arc Energy Ideas podcast. I’m Jackie Forrest.

Peter Tertzakian:

And I’m Peter Tertzakian. Welcome back. Well, in the spirit of timestamping things, because things change so quickly, it is the afternoon of Monday, the May the 12th. We are waiting for cabinet announcements tomorrow, Jackie, from Prime Minister Carney to see who’s going to be, amongst other things, our minister for Enercan, for ECCC, and finance and beyond. So that’s going to be something we can talk about in the next couple of weeks of podcasts, but it’s certainly not today, because we don’t know yet. But what we do know is that there’s also been this morning a temporary relaxation of the China tariffs. China and the United States are back in negotiations. That news has led to a significant bounce in the equity markets and indeed the crude oil markets. So what better time to bring on a guest to talk about crude oil?

Jackie Forrest:

Yeah, for sure. WTI, we’d like to talk WTI. It’s 62 bucks versus $57 at the beginning of May with this 90 day reprieve of the tariffs on China. But we’re very happy today to have our guest, Jeremy Irwin, global crude oil lead at Energy Aspects help us understand not only the most recent changes, but everything that’s going on in crude oil markets, including what is OPEC doing. So Jeremy, welcome to the show.

Jeremy Irwin:

Yeah, thank you very much for having me, Peter, Jackie. I mean, a longtime listener and thanks for the opportunity to join you guys, and share our views on oil markets.

Jackie Forrest:

Okay, Jeremy, and people may say you’re out of London, I don’t know if we said that, but you’re listening to our podcast and it’s because you have a background coming from Alberta. So tell us a little bit about yourself.

Jeremy Irwin:

Yeah, born and raised in Calgary. Completed the applied energy economics program at U of C. Spent about four years on the marketing group for a Canadian midstream company. I shifted over focusing on Canadian crude for a global commodity shop in Calgary for about four years and went over to Geneva to finish a master’s in commodity trading, and ended up in London here with Energy Aspects. So Canada is still fond, it still feels like home, but the scope of what I pay attention to is a little bit broader nowadays.

Peter Tertzakian:

Yeah, wonderful. Well, let’s talk about the current situation. So we talked about the oil price having fallen to $57 on the double whammy of potential recession, sort of like peak chaos with all this trade war and tariffs that are radiating out of the United States, and then also something that’s sort of like deja vu with Saudi Arabia and OPEC+ opening the valves again, bringing more supply onto the market at a time when demand was perceived to be weakening, indeed another million barrels a day by the time you’d add up all the different tranches of new oil coming to market from OPEC+. So are we in the midst of another price war or maybe just characterize the situation as you see it, both on the supply and demand side?

Jeremy Irwin:

Yeah, I mean, we’re certainly getting this question a lot here at Energy Aspects. I think the short answer in our view is no, but let me just unpack that for a moment. We’ve had OPEC+ committed to adding stability to the market for a long time. And now, Peter, as you said, we’re looking at some tariff induced demand weakness and the balances of global fundamentals have been a little bit shaky on the back of that. So I think the real question is, why is now the right time in OPEC’s eyes to bring back additional supply?

And Saudi by and large has done a fantastic job over the last two years, and OPEC+ as an extension of pulling down inventories globally to quite low levels we’re at. And you’ve also had these compliance issues that have been growing within the group with certain member states starting to produce above quota, and that’s been gaining more market traction and really driving headlines. But in the here and now, we’re going into Q3, which is seasonally a strong period for demand with very low oil inventories. And in order to calm some of those compliance issues and with an outlook for the near term fundamentals looking quite supportive, those are the two major reasons we see OPEC+ deciding to bring back additional supply or unwind those voluntary production cuts that have been in place since say November of ’23.

Jackie Forrest:

Right. Well, and Saudi’s been holding back on the OPEC group, you say since ’22 some of these cuts actually. In fact, they cut a lot during the period of COVID, and then there was a period where they got their barrels back on the market, but it was pretty short-lived during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. And they’ve really been sitting on all of these spare capacity, I think it’s officially measured at something like six million barrels a day of spare capacity. What they’re trying to get back into the market was called the sweetener, I think at first, right? Or a lollipop. Like, Saudi was just going to add it for a short time, and that was like two years ago.

And meanwhile, they’ve been sort of flat in terms of their production as a group and non-OPEC led by the United States has been growing. So I look at this and think, “Well, is this a change of strategy here?” In that the last five years has not been great for this strategy if you look at market share. It has been good in terms of revenue, because all things the same, the price of oil wouldn’t have been 70 to $80 over the last two or three years if they hadn’t been constraining their production. Is there any chance that this is a broader long-term strategy versus a short-term thing, just to bring into compliance some of these cheaters? And by the way, Jeremy, I did look it up. The cheaters altogether are over a million barrels a day of production. So meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is sitting here making these voluntary cuts of a million, just so that other people can take their market share even from their own group.

Jeremy Irwin:

Yeah, I think the burden has not been equitably shared across the members, and Saudi has shouldered more of that burden over the prior two years. And I think part of this is coming from Saudi saying, “Hey, we no longer want to pick up this tab. We want to optimize our revenue and if we can’t get prices to perform, we’ll do it with quantities.”

But in large soundings from OPEC, and I’ve had the chance to go to Saudi and speak, and present to them, and they see it as a longer game, I think than a lot of people that focus on US shale. I think they’ve been very patient with US shale and we can get into our views around US shale being the engine of non-OPEC supply growth slowing, which is more structural in our view, but we still think they’re playing the long game and they’ve secured long-term agreements with Asian refiners, and they kind of view that as long-term market share that they’ve captured. And even with the accelerated unwinds, we’ve seen more favorable OSPs pricing to Asia. It doesn’t really look like they’re trying to capture WTI market share in Europe with the accelerated unwind. And just because the quotas are being unwound, as you mentioned, Jackie, a lot of that production has already been on the market. They’ve already been overproducing, so it’s not the actual amount of physical molecules being returned is as severe as say the quotas might indicate.

Peter Tertzakian:

Right. So it’s in the accounting. So you’ve already talked about US shale oil supply. We’re going to come to that later on in the discussion, because it’s really quite important in terms of the longer term here and what price does oil come out of the ground or not, but speak to some of the social media chatter even in the headline chatter, that some people say President Trump has been pushing Saudi and OPEC+ to bring on more supply to lower the price of oil to mitigate against inflationary effects of the trade war. Does that chatter have any merit?

Jeremy Irwin:

We would view that chatter as a bit more speculative. We think if there was some backroom deal done between Trump and the Saudis to lower the price of oil, we think we probably would have heard about it on Truth Social. By and large with Trump’s visit now in the region, we think a lot of those countries want to focus on some of the geopolitical tensions that exist, whether it’s the Houthis, Gaza, Iran. We think that’s the focus of what they want the discussions to focus on and we really think speculation that there’s been some type of backroom deal between Trump and the Saudis is mostly people grasping for a narrative. We don’t think that really has any traction or is legitimate in our view.

Peter Tertzakian:

There is a bit of a perception amongst the US oil producers that this sort of thing is going on and some discontent even with Trump, because lower oil prices are not conducive to the whole drill, baby, drill narrative that was touted during the election campaign and even during the immediate post inauguration period.

Jeremy Irwin:

Yeah, I mean, a lot of Trump’s statements have been a little bit contradictory. You could say the same might hold true about the saga we saw on tariffs on Canadian and Mexican crude largely in Q1 of this year. But the administration has a few levers they can pull, whether it’s leases on federal lands, whether it’s expediting the regulatory process, maybe some reduction in royalty payments, but by and large, in that open free market economy which is US oil production, price is the driver for behavior and for upstream activity. And so, it has been a little bit contradictory trying to grow these oil supplies, but also have low oil pricing. We haven’t seen as much chatter of that recently, because I think the US focus is going to pivot towards liquids and gas more so than black oil growth. And we think that trend probably continues. So the US’s ability to grow black oil is challenged for a number of reasons, which we can dive into.

Jackie Forrest:

Okay, well, let’s get into that. But I did want to say, I was thinking about President Trump, and it’s kind of funny when you go back to the last time the Saudi group decided to open up the valves. It was I think April or March of 2020 and the price of oil went down to 25 bucks, and Donald Trump was actually phoning up Saudi Arabia and Russia, and asking them, “Cut your production, because it’s going to hurt our producers.” So if he’s behind this, maybe oil producers can take a little bit of solace in the fact that maybe there’s a floor for him too, where the price gets too low for him. But let’s talk about the US. Here we are. We’re just above 60, but we were into the 50s. And what is your view on where the direction of US tight oil resource goes at the kind of price levels we’ve been seeing in the last month or so?

Jeremy Irwin:

We went into the year with about 400 a day of US production growth on average. That 400 a day has declined all the way to 50 KBD in 2025 now, and that’s largely shouldered by shale oil having challenges to both offset declines and grow production in a sub 60, sub 65 price environment even. You still have some projects coming online in the Gulf of Mexico, which are longer lead projects, slightly better economics, that capital’s been spent. That’s still adding about 150 KBD of US production growth. But we have the Permian, which is by and large the biggest shale basin declining by about a hundred KBD exit to exit in 2025 now. We’ve erased the growth we had in the Uinta and the Utica, some smaller inland basins that were emerging as marginal growth plays, accelerated declines in the Eagle Ford.

And there’s a number of reasons for that. It’s higher breakevens with inflation showing up across input costs, as well as labor. It’s the amount you need to invest to offset these declines in these shorter cycle shale basins. And it’s also the primary or tier one acreage has been consolidated so much into the hands of the majors, where we see US shale majors being a little bit more disciplined in reserving that prime acreage for a better pricing environment. And they’ve taken out so many of the private operators, which have been the historical drivers of growth when they really drive up production rate to look attractive for a takeover.

So there’s a number of reasons, and the geological reasons are more so that you’re seeing higher water cuts in these basins as you get to tier two, tier three acreage. You’re seeing higher water cuts and gas ratios as well, and all of these things are added costs. When you have to dispose and haul all that water out further and further as you get away from connectivity to disposal sites, these are additional costs that drive up those breakevens. The steel tariffs haven’t helped as well. We were just doing a recap of what we saw in Q1 earnings and collectively we’ve seen the US upstream space cut 1.8 billion in CapEx for this year already. So we’re already seeing some reaction and we think ultimately short cycle shale basins should be the balancing mechanism for this type of global imbalance that we were kind of staring down the barrel of.

Peter Tertzakian:

So let me distill what you’re saying and ask you a sort of specific question. So for those who are uninitiated in US shale plays, these have the real benefit of being very prolific. In other words, they produce a tremendous amount upfront, because of the fracturing of the rocks. So you get almost this burst of production, but a year later, say if the well comes on at a hundred units, a hundred barrels, that’s a lot more than that, typically several thousand. But if it’s a hundred, then the following year it’s down 35% to say 65, and then a third again down the following year.

So to maintain production, let alone grow, you have to keep drilling the next well and the next well, and the next well. And you’re also saying that not only is it a problem of these steep decline rates to keep up on this, what we call the treadmill is that progressively there’s more and more water produced with the oil, and the water has to be separated and hauled away, which is quite expensive. So it becomes more and more expensive to do. So my question is, whereas half a dozen years ago, maybe a little bit more, the notion was that it was economic up to 50 bucks or 55. What is the number today, given added expense, inflation, all in? What is the cutoff point, where the board of directors of an independent oil company in the United States, “You know what? We’re going to pull back on our drilling, we’re going to pull back $1.8 billion,” as you put it. What is it? Is that $65? Is it $60? What’s that notional number, where it doesn’t make sense anymore on average?

Jeremy Irwin:

Yeah, I think focusing on the Permian, which is close to six million, a little over it total, we think the new breakeven is in the mid-50s, so we think it’s around $55 for a breakeven. The second question is would you choose to bring that online in a very low margin environment or would you rather wait for that duck to be completed in a higher price environment as well?

Peter Tertzakian:

So you drill the well and you just kind of leave it there like inventory, before you complete and bring on the flow. So it’s basically storing it until the price environment is better.

Jeremy Irwin:

Yeah, that’s correct. And outside the Permian, it has the lowest breakevens in our kind of upstream economics, and then you kind of get sequentially higher as you go into some of the other inland shale basins, like the Bakken or the DJ, or whatever it might be

Peter Tertzakian:

That are now getting mature. It’s hard to believe, but I mean the North Dakota Bakken came on in I think 2009 in meaningful quantities. So here we are 16 years later, it’s all of a sudden starting to get to be a mature play.

Jeremy Irwin:

Yeah, that’s absolutely correct. I mean, we’ve seen the same thing and say in Oklahoma, there in the Anadarko, where we’ve seen kind of these gradual declines starting to come to fruition, and we’ve seen that show up in less crudes available around Cushing that were traditionally used to make WTI. So we’ve seen this show up in other places already. It’s just now that the Permian’s being challenged, and that was such the economic of US shale growth, and I think that’s the change that’s really kind of turning the corner when you talk about say, an average price for the year of WTI. I mean, our price forecast is 64, so it’s pretty marginal growth at that price in our view.

Jackie Forrest:

Right. So you’re assuming $64 and that it’s almost flat in terms of the overall US production that’s accounting for some Gulf of Mexico. Now there’s differing views out there, obviously. People have lower price levels, like maybe what we just saw, and they’re predicting more of a decline. But I find one thing that’s interesting in the different forecasts that nobody really knows, is that today I think the shale oil producers in general are giving half the money back to their investors. So if the price goes down and they say, “You know what? We’re not going to give all the money back to the investors. We’re just going to drill to maintain our production.”

Then you get a very different result in terms of how much US production declines. If you assume, “No, they’re going to maintain those shareholder payments, those are the most important thing.” Then you’re going to see the decline be much faster. And we’ve never really been through a downturn. We had the COVID, but that price was just so low you couldn’t afford to pay investors or drill. So we never really had a price level that allowed us to see what are the priorities for how they spend. So Jeremy, you’d said you’d looked over the first quarter results, and I know there’s probably not as much there, because it’s kind of new to the producers, but do you have any sense of what will be the priority?

Jeremy Irwin:

Our soundings have definitely been, there’s a priority for capital discipline and to give returns to the shareholders. So I think in the sense that, would they cut dividends to invest that capital, to keep production up? We would probably fade that notion a little bit. We’re seeing in the oil field services as well, where they’re kind of expecting lower growth rates in their business on the back of the shale slowdown. I just see them being more disciplined, and especially with it being mostly majors now that are kind of controlling the throttle, which is US shale supply, more so than in prior cycles. I think they’re probably going to lean towards discipline and keeping the investor whole. I think if you were to see them make the alternative decision, you would expect the share price to take a hit on that type of decision.

Jackie Forrest:

Yeah, I guess the alternative though is if you shrink in your production, that’s not really good long-term either, right?

Peter Tertzakian:

That’s a downward spiral. So the $1.8 billion cut is likely the growth segment. I mean, for the most part, the producer is wanting to keep their production level at a minimum, and then if there isn’t enough capital, then you have a dilemma of, okay, what are you going to cut, the dividend, the share buyback or the production investment? And typically, the production investment to sustain production is the last thing to cut, because that gets into a downward spiral. I think you’re going to see a lot less of the share buybacks, the dividends won’t be compromised, and the growth capital, the amount to actually grow the production. That’s why it’s leveling off and it’s struggling in the mid-60s, because of the reason Jeremy said. The margins are pretty thin.

Jeremy Irwin:

Yeah, and I think with the more higher gas ratios you’re seeing, liquids ratios, like we’ve seen WAHA go negative, it’s gone negative again. So I think there’s some structural challenges there to kind of really optimize the black oil, which is mostly what you’re targeting.

Peter Tertzakian:

Let’s talk about some other countries jurisdictions. Mexico. Pemex is reported to be financially strapped even before this price drop reports that they weren’t paying their bills, or backlogged in their payments and so on. What is their status and what do you see happening to Mexican output?

Jeremy Irwin:

In Mexico, we saw production decline by 200 KBD year over year in Q1 of this year. We think that trend’s largely going to continue. We’ve heard soundings that they’ve completed 8% of their targeted drill program year to date, and some of this is politically driven with them prioritizing, say more of their downstream sector as opposed to the upstream sector, trying to get less reliant on foreign imports of product from largely the US Gulf coast.

But with all that capital and those debt repayment issues ongoing, we think that Mexican production will continue to decline. And when you look at, say what the US Gulf Coast, those complex refiners rely on to optimize their refining kits, it’s a lot of sours from Mexico, as well as you know now you’ve lost Venezuelan heavy, and you really need that longer rigid barrel to fill up those secondary units that those complex US Gulf Coast refiners rely on to make an improved margin relative to say, as a simple refinery. So it stresses the USGC complex refiners to look for alternatives. We’ve seen more Basra heavy pointing into the US Gulf coast recently as a partial replacement per se, for Venezuelan and declining Mayans.

Peter Tertzakian:

That’s from Iraq, right? That’s from Iraq?

Jeremy Irwin:

Yeah, that’s correct.

Peter Tertzakian:

This speaks well to Canadian heavies, doesn’t it?

Jeremy Irwin:

Certainly. Yeah. I think Canadian heavies are in an advantageous spot here, with a lot of the downstream additions we’re seeing globally in the east. They’re tailored to run mediums and heavies. So the Canadian heavy barrel fits that incremental downstream demand quite well, and we hear that from Asia quite often. “How do we get more Canadian heavies? How do we get access to it?”

Jackie Forrest:

Okay, well, this brings us to, it always comes back to United States and Donald Trump, but there are potential for changes to the oil markets, both upside or downside, depending on what he does in some of these countries. You mentioned Venezuela, the sanctions on Venezuela are constraining their production, as well as I guess lack of investment in the country. But we’ve also got news headlines this weekend around potential deals with Russia and Iran that could add more barrels back to the market. So how impactful could that be? Could we have a situation where there’s more downside, because suddenly just as of this weekend, it seems more likely that some of these barrels come back to the market?

Jeremy Irwin:

Maybe I’ll just take them in order. In Russia, we’ve always said that it’s been their adherence to OPEC+ policy that’s restricted their output into global markets. I think the US sanctions were designed to damage Putin’s revenues, but not take their supply off the global market. So if you get any type of relaxation in US sanctions against Russia, due to some peace negotiations around Russia, Ukraine, we don’t think that adds outright supply from Russia on the global market. They’ll add supply as OPEC unwinds the voluntary cuts. On Venezuela, I think the threat from Trump that any country that’s seen running or purchasing Venezuelan crude would be subject to 25% tariff has actually been quite effective. We’ve seen all the majors that had waivers to process it, whether that be Repsol, Eni, Reliance, and as well as Chevron in the US, they’ve all stepped away and they’re looking for alternatives.

So that really kind of puts the onus on mostly China and the teapots to run more of the Venezuelan heavy. But we have Venezuelan production coming off by about 200,000 barrels a day this year, and the wild card on sanctions, and probably the most meaningful one is certainly Iran. Under Trump 1.0, the maximum pressure campaign that Trump kind of put forward got those Iranian exports as low as 400,000 barrels a day. Then when a blind eye was largely turned by the Biden administration, we saw those exports creep up to close to two million barrels a day, certain months. Now they’re hovering kind of around 1.7, 1.8 right now, and we think those will come down to about a million a day by year-end, because we are anticipating a maximum pressure campaign by the US administration with increased or tightening of sanctions on Iran to take some of those barrels out of the global market. So that’s in our global balances currently for the back half of this year.

Jackie Forrest:

Right, but it seems like, who knows what happens. There’s the potential even for a deal, and then those barrels may come back, right?

Jeremy Irwin:

Yeah, I think what our geopol team has been saying is that it’s sort of a hard line, where the US administration doesn’t want them to have uranium enrichment capacities, and there’s been some posturing saying they’re making some progress, but when we review the meeting notes, it seems like those red lines haven’t really budged. So I think our view would still be that a deal with Iran and US is unlikely in our view, and that’s why we have that supply coming out of the market, at least in our balances.

Peter Tertzakian:

But let’s move on to the demand side, because there’s interesting things going on there as well. Let’s talk about China, because certainly in the 2000s it was just roaring in terms of its oil demand growth. Its GDP was growing by five to 10% a year, and then in the 2010s it started to decelerate a little bit. They got more efficient in their use of their oil, they started to diversify into renewables, and now in the last half dozen years, much more electric vehicles and so on. Certainly the elasticity, in other words, the sensitivity of their oil consumption to their economic growth or lack of growth, depending upon the cycle that we’re in, has decelerated. Can you talk about China and where we’re at? Because I mean, it was just one of the biggest, what you say, drivers of the demand side and the biggest drivers of therefore price appreciation over the course of the last 20 years.

Jeremy Irwin:

Yeah. So we completely agree, where we’ve seen that decoupling of Chinese oil demand growth and GDP growth really since COVID. We think Chinese diesel demand has probably already peaked. We think gasoline demand probably peaks this year. We’ve seen a big ramp up in their EV adoption. We’ve seen things like LNG trucking that’s weighed more on their demand for distillate. But by and large, we don’t think China will be this engine of oil demand growth go forward, and they have to pass the baton to smaller countries that can incrementally contribute, but not at the same outright size as China.

So we would point to India as probably the next biggest driver of growth, but you also see some smaller contributions from LATAM or Latin America, Africa. You’re seeing the Middle East region grow kind of marginally all fuel types. Growth is slowing, but the outright demand is still grinding higher. So I think China’s somewhat turned the corner. It’s not going to be that demand growth center any longer. And with gasoline demand probably peaking this year, yes, sure, jet and petrochemical demand can continue, but your prime major transportation fuel demand, that growth is over in our view.

Jackie Forrest:

Okay. I want to come back to the short term because short term there’s the potential for a recession. But since we’re on this topic, considering all that, do you think that oil demand peaks? And if so, when? On the global level.

Jeremy Irwin:

Yeah, we have it in 2032, where we see global oil demand peaking and thereafter, we see it as sort of a long tail. We don’t see it dramatically declining thereafter, but that’s where we see the peak occurring, slow down in your more OECD countries, that’s already well underway. And once you kind of have that surge in growth from some of more of these developing countries, and we’d expect their transition period to be tighter or quicker than what we’ve seen historically, with just advancements in technology and there being a bit of a roadmap for that. Now, 2032 is kind of where we have it penciled for where it peaks.

Jackie Forrest:

Well, I like the precise number. One follow up question on that is, it seems in the last 12 to 18 months, there has been a growing recognition that some of these clean energy technologies are going to roll out more slowly, like electric cars are not going to maybe grow at the rate people thought. The US is really stepping back in terms of probably not requiring electric vehicles at the same rate as they thought before. But on the other hand, they’re growing a lot in China. So would you revise this outlook based on this sort of softening in terms of environmental policy that we’ve seen in the last 12 months?

Jeremy Irwin:

I think what our view in say, ex-China’s predicated on say, how quickly EV adoption can occur is really the state of those grids. And we really think that is kind of a longer lead need, that you need that proper infrastructure in order to enable the type of adoption we’ve seen in China. I don’t think any soundings from the demand team that they’re looking at sort of delaying our peak number.

Jackie Forrest:

Okay. Well, we’ve been talking about the very long-term, but I think what’s on a lot of people’s minds listening to the podcast is what’s going to happen in the next year? We see a long-term trend where oil demand kind of grows steady, but recessions or even depressions cause a short-term decline, like we saw with the COVID pandemic or other recessions. So I know Energy Aspects made some headlines right after the Liberation Day tariffs, saying that if they all went into effect, there would be potentially a million barrel a day drop in demand. Of course, lots has changed, and even over the weekend now, we suddenly are seeing the Chinese tariffs being a lot smaller. What’s your view now in terms of the potential for oil demand and how have you revised that compared to maybe earlier in the year before all this tariff news?

Jeremy Irwin:

Yeah, so right now we’re at about 800,000 barrels a day of oil demand growth this year. It has gone from starting the year about at a million barrels a day, a little bit below consensus, because our view is always that tariffs were real and they were going to have some impact, and we think that’s held true with just how long Trump has been hammering on tariffs for. That million a day got watered down to about 700,000 barrels a day when we saw the US-Chinese tariffs really escalate to embargo levels. Then it further got reduced to 500,000 barrels a day when we saw the tariff board get rolled out at the White House in early April and really saw some of those higher than expected percentages. But now with the larger than expected Chinese stimulus and the 90-day pause, we’re back to about 800,000 barrels a day of oil demand growth. And that’s slightly lower than what we’ve heard kind of across our soundings.

Jackie Forrest:

Sounds like you guys have been very busy revising your numbers. It’s like four revisions since April 2nd.

Jeremy Irwin:

Yeah, I feel terrible for our demand team this year. A lot of work.

Peter Tertzakian:

Well, let me drag you back into the long term. From your international perch, I want to ask you about the Paris Agreement, because you’re a lot closer to Paris than we are from your London perch. So in just over six months, we’re going to celebrate the 10-year anniversary of the Paris Agreement. What are you hearing from your international perch, or what are you sensing as it relates to the Paris Agreement, the net-zero by 2050, all that kind of stuff?

Jeremy Irwin:

Yeah, Peter, what I could say is in our conversations over say the trailing 16 months, it has rarely come up. Whereas prior to that, it sounded like it was a topic of discussion in most meetings. So I just feel like the market’s attention on it has probably diminished slightly. Does some of this have to do with Trump’s agenda and what he’s pushing forward? Maybe, but I really couldn’t add too much more insight on that topic. I just feel like it hasn’t come up in meetings and we haven’t had as much focus on it over the last year, year and a half. I think these pendulums tend to swing back and forth, and maybe currently we’re at one of the extremes where it’s not as topical or as focused.

Peter Tertzakian:

Yeah, I mean, I think it’s certainly between trade wars and hot wars, military conflicts, I mean, it’s certainly taken a backseat.

Jackie Forrest:

Well, let’s talk about Canada some more. As you know, we have a new prime minister, I’m sure you’re not so far away from Canada that you haven’t followed all the news around that, and he’s talking about expanding our energy infrastructure. But as you know, it’s been very difficult in Canada to get any of this done. Now, what do you think global energy traders and investors are thinking? Do they really think Canada is going to do it this time, or is there a lot of wait and see until it’s actually done? What’s the scuttlebutt?

Jeremy Irwin:

I think there’s definitely demand for the barrel. We hear about it from both a reliability of supply and quality perspective. I think Canadian crude is looked at quite favorably. Of course, global traders will always be there to participate in making those markets and taking some margin. And I’d say we’ve seen that in the Pacific ever since the Transmountain expansion came online. There’s also demand for things like LPG. You want more in Asia, especially Korea and Japan voice that quite a bit, but I don’t think anyone internationally is willing to be too bullish on Canada’s ability to grow outright production. We think we can achieve one to 200 KBD of growth for ’25 and into ’26, and then if you get the additional 150 a day of a mainline expansion, that growth has a little bit more runway. So I think there’s optimism on the demand side, but maybe not on the supply side that you’re really going to see a meaningful amount of Canadian growth occur just in this environment.

Peter Tertzakian:

Well, great. So we’ve been talking with Jeremy Irwin. He’s the crude oil lead for Energy Aspects out of London. We’ve discussed all sorts of things in the weeds of supply and demand for oil markets, or maybe I should say, the pipes of oil markets. So above all, Jeremy, it’s great to see some Calgary talent rise onto an international stage. So we’re really grateful that you were able to join us from London, and good luck with all the work that you do. I know it’s a challenging and chaotic environment, but thanks for being with us.

Jeremy Irwin:

Well, I really appreciate the opportunity and I’ll continue to tune in. And Energy Aspects might be opening up an office in Calgary soon, so hopefully that comes to fruition and all the best this year.

Peter Tertzakian:

Wonderful.

Jackie Forrest:

Okay. And we will put a link to Energy Aspects websites. You guys do some great research that people can look into, how they can become members and get access to that. So thank you to our listeners as well. If you enjoyed this podcast, please rate us on the app that you listen to and tell someone else about us.

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